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U.S. CONVENTIONAL ACCESS STR ATEGY
Denying China a Conventional First-Strike Capability
Sam Goldsmith

T

he People’s Republic of China makes extensive territorial claims over Taiwan,
the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. China’s neighbors openly dispute these claims and the international community does not recognize most of
them. The Chinese government views the settlement of these disputes on terms
favorable to China as a national priority. Ideally, the Chinese government would
like to resolve these disputes through diplomatic channels or by using coercive
and paramilitary techniques that fall short of triggering armed conflicts.1 However, concurrently the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is preparing war plans
and acquiring capabilities to resolve these disputes through the use of armed
force. The Chinese government views all its territorial disputes as “core interests”
and has signaled its willingness to achieve these core interests through the use of
armed force. The U.S. government openly opposes any coercive or aggressive activities that upset the status quo, putting it at odds with the Chinese government.2
The problem is that the Chinese leadership appears unconvinced that the
United States would risk a conflict with China—one that could escalate to a
nuclear war—over disputes concerning territoSam Goldsmith has over eight years of research and
ries that geographically are distant from the U.S.
analysis experience focused primarily on military
capabilities, submarines, and surface combatants.
mainland and seemingly are unrelated to core U.S.
He has received a master of arts (with honors) from
national security interests.3 However, the PLA has a
the Australian National University (ANU) Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, a master of project
relatively small nuclear arsenal, estimated at fewer
management from ANU, and a bachelor of arts (with
than four hundred warheads, in contrast with the
honors) from Monash University. He has done pro4
fessional research consulting work in the Australian U.S. arsenal, which has around 1,550 warheads.
defense field.
Any nuclear strike China made on the United
States would involve only a fraction of the PLA’s
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overall arsenal, because it would need to retain
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some reserve to deter other nuclear-armed neighbors, such as Russia and India.
If the Chinese leadership authorized a nuclear strike against the U.S. homeland,
or even a limited nuclear strike against forward-deployed U.S. forces, it would
be inviting overwhelming devastation from the considerably larger U.S. nuclear
force.5 For these reasons, China likely would aim to confine itself to the use
of conventional weapons during any potential high-intensity conflict with the
United States—particularly given that China already possesses a lethal array of
long-range, conventional, theater-strike options.6 Such a strategic, conventional,
first-strike option is one that the United States should seek to deny China by
developing an effective conventional access strategy.
The U.S. military has three principal strategic objectives. The first is to protect
the U.S. mainland and offshore U.S. territories from armed attacks.7 The second
is to foster a stable, rules-based, global security order through an interconnected
web of alliances and partnerships. The third is to deter and, if necessary, decisively defeat aggressors through the projection of military power. Under the national
military strategy that the Joint Staff published in 2015, the U.S. military would
deter and defeat state aggressors by leveraging U.S. forward-deployed units,
force-projection capabilities, alliances, communications networks, and “resilient
logistics” infrastructure.8 This strategy appears identical to the U.S. military’s
force-projection approach to the 1991 Gulf War.9 But the central problem with
emulating the Gulf War style of force-projection operations is that in future decades the U.S. military no longer will enjoy uncontested use of its forward bases
or the ocean.10
Operation DESERT STORM required the U.S. military to transport around five
hundred thousand personnel, 6.1 million tons of fuel, and 3.7 million tons of
equipment and stores to the Persian Gulf theater. Building up sufficient personnel, equipment, stores, and supplies required seven months of intense air and
sealift operations, as well as access to bases in Saudi Arabia.11 Because of the range
limitations of tactical aircraft and payload-laden airlifters, the U.S. Air Force
(USAF) was forced to use in-flight refueling tankers to form “air bridges.” Air
bridges allowed aircraft with range limitations to cross oceans by flying between
in-flight refueling tankers until they reached the desired theater of operations.
USAF in-flight refueling tankers also supported U.S. and allied short-range tactical aircraft, flying around 16,868 sorties to deliver four hundred thousand tons
of fuel in flight.12 The U.S. military deployed a total of around 1,600 short-range
tactical aircraft that operated from in-theater air bases and six U.S. Navy (USN)
aircraft carriers stationed in littoral waters.13 Long-range, precision-guided munitions accounted for around 5 percent of all air-to-ground ordnance delivered,
supported by around sixteen Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites.14 U.S.
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military satellite constellations also gathered intelligence and provided global
communications.15
The PLA keenly observed the 1991 Gulf War, particularly American exploitation of conventional, long-range, precision strikes.16 The PLA also observed how
two USN carrier strike groups intervened during the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis.
Both developments highlighted the PLA’s technological inferiority and inability
to prevent USN sea power from threatening the Chinese mainland.17 In response,
the PLA has developed a “counterintervention strategy,” designed specifically to
negate traditional U.S. advantages in global force projection. The core problem is
that the PLA’s counterintervention capabilities could be used to undermine the
U.S. military’s credibility to deter and defeat state aggressors—thereby increasing
the likelihood of a China-U.S. armed conflict.
PLA COUNTERINTERVENTION STRATEGY
Strategically, the PLA is tasked with using its counterintervention strategy to
deter the United States and deny the U.S. military access to the western Pacific.
The primary purpose of this strategy is to provide the Chinese government with
the ability to isolate and coerce U.S. allies or regional countries to accept Chinese
sovereignty demands in a number of territorial disputes.18 The PLA might be
directed to apply this counterintervention strategy in relation to the disputed
sovereignty over Taiwan, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China
Sea.19
The PLA’s counterintervention strategy requires four main types of military
operations: theater strike, denial of service, antiaccess, and area-denial operations.
Ideally, all four types of operations would be carried out simultaneously; however, the PLA’s finite resources might force it to prioritize. If the PLA were forced to
prioritize, it would place the greatest emphasis on neutralizing forward-deployed
U.S. forces, followed by denying critical services to the U.S. military, followed by
activities to prevent the U.S. military from reinforcing the Pacific theater. Theaterstrike operations would be required to disable or destroy forward-deployed U.S.
military assets, including aircraft, ships, and submarines, in addition to infrastructure at U.S. bases located west of Pearl Harbor.20 Strikes against these targets
would be executed rapidly at the outset of a conflict to catch adversaries unprepared and achieve decisive in-theater superiority.21
In carrying out this strategy, the PLA will employ each of its four subordinate
service branches: the PLA Army, the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force
(PLAAF), and the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). PLAN submarines would execute
undersea attacks against U.S. ships and submarines in port or at sea and strike at
land targets with cruise missiles.22 The PLAAF would execute air strikes against
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U.S. aircraft on the ground or in the air, as well as U.S. ships and submarines in
port or at sea. Strikes against U.S. bases would occur with extended-range missiles launched from PLAAF combat aircraft or conventional ballistic missiles
launched from the Chinese mainland.23
PLAAF combat aircraft can deliver antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) out to
two thousand kilometers (km) from the Chinese mainland, and PLAAF H-6
long-range bombers can deliver land-attack cruise missiles out to 3,300 km from
the Chinese mainland. Air-launched cruise missiles would be supplemented by
PLARF conventional ballistic missiles. The PLARF’s DF-16 short-range ballistic
missile would strike land targets at a range of around eight hundred kilometers.
The PLARF’s DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) would strike land
targets or moving ships in the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) configuration at a range of around 1,500 km.24 The PLARF’s DF-26 intermediate-range
ballistic missile (IRBM) would strike land targets or moving ships in the ASBM
configuration at ranges around three thousand kilometers.25
Denial-of-service operations would aim at denying the United States unfettered use of its command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure.26 Successful PLA
denial-of-service operations would hinder the U.S. military’s ability to execute
land-attack strikes from USN submarines in the western Pacific, receive up-todate intelligence from USN submarines on patrol, marshal combat resources
to reinforce the Pacific theater, and communicate with surviving U.S. forces in
the western Pacific. One method would be for the PLA to apply its antisatellite
(ASAT) technologies to incapacitate, disrupt, or destroy U.S. military satellite
constellations used for global communications, satellite navigation, and intelligence gathering.27 PLA ASAT technologies include lasers, microwave technologies, and hard-kill methodologies.28 Cyberwarfare capabilities also provide the
PLA with a sophisticated method to disrupt or deny the U.S. military’s use of its
C4ISR infrastructure.29
Antiaccess operations would degrade or deny USAF and USN forceprojection capabilities for accessing the western Pacific, thus isolating U.S. allies.30 Denying USN seaborne force-projection capabilities would be a priority
because over 90 percent of all U.S. military assets, stores, and equipment are
transported by sea.31 PLA antiaccess operations would force USN task forces to
run a gauntlet of layered offensive PLA capabilities during the approach to the
western Pacific.32 Surviving USN task forces likely would arrive in theater with
depleted missile magazines, having suffered fleet-wide damage or ship losses, or
both, just to come within range of the Chinese mainland. Weapons and vessels
available for Chinese antiaccess operations include DF-21D ASBMs, potentially
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DF-26 ASBMs, air-launched ASCMs, diesel-electric and nuclear-powered attack
submarines, and surface combatants.33
U.S. airpower also could be denied access to the western Pacific through the
deployment of PLAN aircraft carrier battle groups. Other options might include
arming PLAN nuclear-powered attack submarines with submarine-launched, antiair missiles to shoot down USAF in-flight refueling tankers and cargo-transport
aircraft. Concurrently, some PLA units would aim to interdict U.S. follow-on
forces outside the western Pacific, particularly in Hawaii and Australia, with the
aim of harassing and interfering with the deployment of U.S. and allied forces
into theater.34
Area-denial operations would be required to limit the freedom of maneuver of
air or maritime forces in coastal areas close to the Chinese mainland. PLA capabilities that could be used for area-denial operations include advanced sea mines,
diesel-electric submarines, maritime strike aircraft, surface combatants, Type
022 missile patrol boats armed with ASCMs, coastal ASCM batteries, land-based
air-defense systems, and land-based conventional and rocket artillery batteries.35
PLA PASSIVE DEFENSES
Concurrently, the PLA has invested in three types of passive-defense capabilities
designed specifically to enable continuity of PLA conventional and nuclear warfighting capabilities, even if the Chinese mainland comes under heavy attack.
PLA passive-defense capabilities include land-based sensor networks; land-based
command, control, and communications (C3) networks; and hardened facilities.
First, the PLA has invested in extensive land-based sensor networks to provide
persistent wide-area surveillance of the western Pacific to enable PLA landbased, long-range strike capabilities. The PLA uses land-based Skywave over-thehorizon (OTH) radar technology to track aircraft and ships at ranges of several
thousand kilometers from the Chinese mainland.36 The PLA uses Surfacewave
OTH radar arrays to track aircraft and ships at long ranges from the Chinese
mainland.37 These capabilities are being augmented with other infrared, pulsedDoppler radar, phased-array radar, and passive radar detection technologies.38
The PLA uses passive undersea sensors to detect and track submarines operating
within Chinese littoral waters.39 The PLA’s land-based intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are augmented by PLAAF airborne warning and control system aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and ISR satellites.40
Second, the PLA has invested in survivable, land-based C3 systems designed
specifically to enable the Chinese national command hierarchy to retain basic
C3 functions over all PLA branches, even while under heavy attack. 41 PLA
C3 systems include underground fiber-optic cables; microwave relays; and
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TABLE 1
TYPES OF HARD TARGETS
Type
Hardened structure
(HS)

Definition
Aboveground HS: aboveground facilities or structures that are protected from kinetic and air-blast weapons effects because of their aerodynamic shape that deflects
blast waves—typically covered with earth and reinforced concretea
Shallow-underground HS: underground facilities or structures up to twenty meters
below the earth’s surface
Deep-underground HS: underground facilities or structures twenty or more meters
below the earth’s surface

Hard and deeply buried target
(HDBT)

Underground facilities one to seven hundred meters below the earth’s surface that
protect a country’s national command structure, critical activities, equipment,
personnel, or strategic military response options from nuclear weapons effects

Note:
a. National Research Council of the National Academies, Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons (Washington, DC: National Academies
Press, 2005), p. 14.

long-range, high-frequency radio technologies augmented by civilian communication channels.42
Third, the PLA has invested heavily in aboveground hardened structures
(HSs), shallow-underground HSs, deep-underground HSs, and strategic hard
and deeply buried targets (HDBTs) (see table 1). The purpose of these hardened
facilities is to enable the Chinese national command hierarchy, strategic assets,
and other key capabilities such as logistics to survive and remain operational,
even after a nuclear strike.43 The PLA has invested in strategic HDBTs to protect
the Chinese national command hierarchy in the event of an armed conflict.44
These HDBTs are connected to the outside world through extensive land-based
communications networks that enable the Chinese national command hierarchy
to remain in command of its sea, air, and land forces.45
The PLARF has an extensive network of hardened tunnels and facilities buried
deep underground and within mountains that can protect land-based strategic
assets such as road-mobile ballistic missiles, launchers, and PLARF personnel.46
Some reports indicate that the PLARF has 4,856 kilometers of such hardened
and deeply buried tunnels, some as deep as one thousand meters. The tunnels
form part of an extensive underground web of HDBT facilities and are serviced
by internal transport or train networks that move ordnance and launchers. These
facilities have surface-level entrances where the missile transporter-erectorlaunchers (TELs) can access surface-level launchpads.47
The PLAAF has hardened its air bases to protect its combat aircraft.48 PLAAF
air bases feature hardened aboveground HSs, such as aircraft hangars, with reinforced concrete protection estimated to be between 0.9 and 1.2 meters thick.
PLAAF air bases also feature underground HSs that function as hangars and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/5

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 40

6

2/25/19 10:40 AM

Goldsmith: U.S. Conventional Access Strategy: Denying China a Conventional F

GOLDSMITH

41

storage facilities. Some of the PLAAF underground HSs are very large, provided
with multiple entrances, constructed inside mountains, and covered by anywhere
from twenty to sixty meters of concrete, dirt, and rock. Other passive measures
include revetments between parked aircraft and long paved areas that can be
used as emergency runways, as well as multiple points of access for runways.
These measures usually are augmented by advanced camouflage and advanced
air-defense systems.49
The PLAN also has constructed extensive underground HSs to protect its
submarine forces, accessed by sea-level tunnels in coastal areas. These facilities
offer PLA submarines the ability to deploy covertly and return without being visible to U.S. overhead surveillance capabilities.50 The PLAN naval base on Hainan
Island currently is equipped with hardened underground submarine facilities of
this nature.51 The PLAN also plans to construct a significantly larger and more
modern underground HS naval base sufficient to protect and house its nuclearpowered, ballistic-missile submarines.52
PLA CONVENTIONAL FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY
The PLA’s most significant counterintervention capability is its inventory of longrange conventional ballistic missiles, particularly given that the U.S. military does
not field an equivalent capability. PLA DF-21 MRBMs and ASBMs have ranges
around 1,500 km; PLA DF-26 IRBMs and ASBMs have ranges around three
thousand kilometers. It is also important to note that the PLA currently possesses
between two and three hundred MRBMs and likely will expand this inventory
with the introduction of the DF-26. The long range and growing inventory of
PLA conventional ballistic missiles would force relatively slow U.S. maritime assets to run a lethal gauntlet of PLA ASBMs while they are unable to return fire
and degrade the threat.53
The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence has assessed that the PLA’s conventional
ballistic missiles use maneuvering reentry vehicles (MARVs) equipped with
infrared and radar seekers, enabling PLA ballistic missiles to acquire fixed or
moving targets during the terminal phase of flight. PLA MARVs are difficult
opponents because of their significant agility and high reentry speeds (around
Mach 12), as well as electronic warfare, decoy, chaff, and flare countermeasures.54
PLA conventional ballistic missiles have the potential to carry submunitions
warheads capable of inflicting wide-area destruction, which increases their threat
profile.55 Against fixed land targets, however, MARV penetrator warheads provide the capability to inflict serious damage to hardened targets.56 MARV penetrator warheads could sink USN ships outright, whereas submunitions warheads
could inflict a range of damage to them.57 For instance, aircraft carrier flight
decks, arresting gear, catapults, and landing signal systems could be damaged,
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thereby preventing flight operations.58 Similarly, USN cruisers and destroyers
could suffer damage to phased-array radar panels and Mk 41 vertical launching system (VLS) missile batteries. Damage of either type likely would result in
a “mission kill,” rendering the damaged ship unfit to fight. The predicted high
lethality and significant impact of PLA conventional ballistic missiles pose a serious challenge to the survivability of U.S. forces operating in the western Pacific
and thus to U.S. force-projection capabilities.
The PLA’s unmatched conventional ballistic-missile arsenal and rapidly evolving military capabilities, combined with a perception of relative invulnerability to
U.S. retaliatory strikes, could lure Chinese leaders into a belief that a conventional
first strike might deliver temporary PLA regional superiority, during which time
Chinese leaders could settle regional disputes coercively, on their terms.59 A
perception of PLA superiority in a conventional theater strike is not helped by
the U.S. military’s apparent lack of a strategy outlining a credible response to an
overwhelming PLA conventional first strike.60 Without clear U.S. deterrence, the
risk of miscalculation only will increase—particularly as the PLA’s confidence in
its own capabilities grows in future decades.61
TOWARD A U.S. CONVENTIONAL ACCESS STRATEGY
The Cold War concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) maintained relative stability between the United States and the Soviet Union.62 Underpinning
MAD was the knowledge that both sides possessed credible nuclear secondstrike capabilities—the ability to absorb a nuclear first strike and still retain
sufficient operable capability to respond with unacceptable devastation.63 This
understanding provided a relative degree of stability, since both sides clearly
understood their mutual vulnerability and that any preemptive nuclear first
strike would receive a response in kind.64 Using Cold War deterrence theory as
an underlying basis, this article advocates that the U.S. military should consider
introducing a conventional access strategy, designed specifically to balance the
PLA’s counterintervention strategy. The purpose would be to provide the U.S.
military with an improved capacity to deter a PLA conventional first strike, and,
if necessary, degrade PLA capabilities with long-range conventional strike forces,
to facilitate access for follow-on U.S. forces.
Strategically, a U.S. conventional access strategy would provide Chinese leaders with a clearer understanding of how the U.S. military can impose costs on
China, even in the aftermath of a PLA conventional first strike. Operationally, it
would increase the permissiveness of the western Pacific for forward-deployed
and follow-on U.S. forces. The Department of Defense’s Joint Operational Access
Concept (JOAC) states that “in-range combat forces at the beginning of a crisis
can facilitate operational access” for other forces in antiaccess/area-denial (A2/
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/5

7270_Goldsmith.indd 42

8

2/27/19 2:56 PM

Goldsmith: U.S. Conventional Access Strategy: Denying China a Conventional F

GOLDSMITH

43

AD) environments.65 The primary operational objective of a U.S. conventional
access strategy would be to degrade the effectiveness of the PLA’s conventional
strike capability, as opposed to seeking its complete eradication, so as to facilitate
access for U.S. forces entering the western Pacific. The JOAC states that the U.S.
military must be able to strike deep into enemy A2/AD capability networks to
“disrupt the integrity of the enemy defensive system” and that preferred targets
include “logistics and command and control nodes, long range firing units and
strategic and operational reserves.”66 The secondary operational objective would
be to deny the PLA unfettered use of communications, logistics, and transport
capabilities such as airfields, airports, ports, rail networks, land-based C4ISR
networks, and fuel or ordnance stocks. By degrading PLA strike and war-fighting
capabilities, forward-deployed U.S. forces could increase the permissiveness of
the western Pacific for U.S. forces arriving in theater.
A U.S. conventional access strategy would require four distinct capabilities.
A theater-wide passive-defense capability would enhance the ability of forwarddeployed U.S. forces to survive initial PLA conventional strikes. A conventional
theater-strike capability would enable the U.S. military to begin degrading PLA
capabilities immediately at the outset of a conflict, without access to in-flight
refueling tankers or usable runways. A theater-recovery capability would restore
basic runway access in the aftermath of PLA conventional strikes. A rapidresponse capability would allow long-range USAF bombers and fighter escorts to
deploy rapidly to U.S. bases in the western Pacific, capitalizing on freshly repaired
runways as well as pre-positioned stocks of aviation fuel and conventional earthpenetrating ordnance.
Theater-Wide Passive-Defense Capability
The PLA aims to be capable of striking at intercontinental distances with hypersonic boost-glide (HBG) missiles by 2020 and capable of striking at intercontinental distances with hypersonic aircraft by 2025.67 The 2013 Air-Sea Battle Concept (ASBC) states that in a future armed conflict, U.S. bases could be attacked
and that “even the US homeland cannot be considered a sanctuary.”68 Both factors
indicate that the United States should consider hardening its infrastructure in the
western Pacific and at key locations across Hawaii and the continental United
States, so as to deny any adversary a relatively easy way to degrade or deny U.S.
force-projection capabilities.
Within this context, a theater-wide passive-defense capability would require
improvements in the hardening of critical fixed sites to withstand kinetic threats,
and the hardening of critical C4ISR systems to resist nonkinetic strikes. Hardening of critical fixed sites might include building aboveground HS submarine
pens, aboveground HS aircraft shelters, and deep-underground HS fuel- and
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ordnance-storage facilities, as well as deep-underground HS or HDBT shelters
for theater-strike missiles, personnel, and base-repair kits. A 2007 study from
the RAND Corporation notes that major U.S. forward bases should protect their
in-theater fuel stocks in underground HSs and that stores should be sufficient
to enable several weeks of high-intensity air operations.69 Hardening of critical
C4ISR systems might include the protection of base computer networks and
electronic infrastructure from the effects of cyber, electromagnetic pulse (EMP),
and high-powered microwave (HPM) weapon effects. At the bare minimum,
such improvements in hardened infrastructure should be rolled out across all
U.S. bases in the western Pacific. It also might be desirable for the U.S. military to
consider selectively rolling out similar hardened infrastructure packages across
key Hawaiian and mainland installations, such as Pearl Harbor and San Diego.
Conventional Theater-Strike Capability
A conventional theater-strike capability would allow forward-deployed U.S.
forces to respond within minutes or hours of a PLA conventional first strike. A
U.S. conventional theater-strike capability would enable the U.S. military to begin
degrading PLA strike and C4ISR capabilities at the outset of a conflict, even if
U.S. bases, air assets, and naval assets were destroyed or otherwise unavailable.
A conventional theater-strike capability should consist of theater-strike missiles,
hypersonic undersea strike missiles, ASAT weapons, cyberstrike weapons, and
autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). As mentioned earlier, the purpose of
such strikes would not be to destroy these capabilities outright but to degrade
PLA strike and war-fighting capabilities, thereby achieving the JOAC objective
of helping ensure access for follow-on U.S. forces attempting to enter the theater
of operations.70
Theater-Strike Missiles. Theater-strike missiles would enable forward-deployed
U.S. forces to execute conventional strikes against heavily defended targets on the
Chinese mainland, without support from in-flight refueling tankers or in-theater
runway access. Conventional missile strikes could take place in immediate response to, or in the aftermath of, a PLA conventional first strike. For U.S. bases
to retain a credible conventional theater-strike capability, theater-strike missiles
would have to be stored in hardened facilities.
One option might be road-mobile IRBMs with conventional warheads and
a range of 5,500 km, sufficient to strike at Haixi City in Qinghai Province from
Guam or the Cocos Islands. Another option might be an HBG missile with intercontinental or intermediate range, consisting of a rocket booster stack and
hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).71 After the boost phase, the HGV would exhibit
a limited ballistic trajectory before sharply reentering the atmosphere, followed
by the HGV’s transition into a high-altitude glide phase of flight to the intended
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/5
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target.72 The United States is developing an HGV that can be deployed from a
modified USAF intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) rocket booster.73 Either
option could carry a variety of conventional warheads, including penetrators for
hardened targets, submunitions for wide-area destruction, and EMP or HPM
warheads to cripple electronic infrastructure.
HGVs could exploit hypersonic terminal speeds and combine with existing conventional penetrator technology to threaten PLA HSs. The GBU-39 is
a small-diameter bomb that weighs 130 kilograms (kg) and can penetrate over
four meters of reinforced concrete.74 The GBU-28 is a 2,268 kg bomb capable of
penetrating over thirty meters of earth or over six meters of reinforced concrete.75
The GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrator (MOP) weighs 13,600 kg and is capable of penetrating over sixty meters of five-thousand-pounds-per-square-inch
reinforced concrete.76 One option is for theater-strike missile HGVs to deploy
existing GBU-39 ordnance, as GBU-28 and GBU-57 ordnance is too large and
heavy. The other option is for the United States to develop a new penetrator that
combines hypersonic speeds with the GBU-57’s penetration technology, which
would be sufficient to threaten all grades of HSs up to one hundred meters below the earth’s surface. Using GBU-39 technology could provide HBG theaterstrike missiles with the ability to neutralize aboveground HSs, such as ordnance
magazines and hardened aircraft shelters, and also to inflict heavy damage to
paved areas necessary for flight operations. Using the GBU-28 technology could
provide theater-strike missiles with the ability to neutralize all grades of shallowunderground HSs and some grades of deep-underground HSs. Using the GBU57 technology could provide theater-strike missiles with the ability to neutralize
most grades of deep-underground HSs.
HBG theater-strike missiles ideally should be capable of being launched from
road-mobile TELs. Road-mobile HBG strike missiles would enable forwarddeployed U.S. bases, such as Guam, to protect ordnance and launchers from
PLA conventional strikes in HDBT facilities. After a PLA conventional strike,
the TELs could be driven out of their hardened facilities and launched. Roadmobile weapons also would increase the tactical survivability of deployed TELs,
as they would be better dispersed and camouflaged compared with fixed missile
batteries.
HBG theater-strike missiles should be used to target the weakest points of PLA
hardened facilities and infrastructure. Typically, these will be a hardened facility’s
communication links to the outside world and the surface-level entrances. The
reason for attacking entrances is that every underground hardened facility, by its
very nature, will have some surface-level access point. This is a vulnerability that
can be exploited by U.S. HBG theater-strike missiles to collapse the entrances to

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 45

11

2/25/19 10:40 AM

46

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 2, Art. 5

PLA hardened facilities, sealing all personnel and ordnance inside, or at the very
least impeding the movement of PLA assets in and out of the facility. In the case
of PLA HSs inside mountains, surface-level entrances would be vulnerable to
landslides, which could be triggered by U.S. HBG warhead detonations higher
up the mountain. However, the main problem with targeting the entrances of
PLA HSs is that they are likely to be camouflaged and “virtually undetectable by
current imagery assets.”77 Locating a significant portion of PLA hardened facility
entrances would require years of dedicated intelligence gathering by the entire
U.S. Intelligence Community, using its wide array of collection techniques.
Hypersonic Undersea Strike Missiles. Hypersonic undersea strike missiles would
enable forward-deployed U.S. forces to strike at heavily defended but not hardened targets across the Chinese mainland. Prime targets would include but not be
limited to Chinese civilian airports, military airstrips, military and civilian ports,
electrical power grids, communications nodes, and fuel depots. The purpose of
striking at these targets would be to deny the PLA unfettered use of these facilities, which otherwise could be exploited to enhance PLA operations.
Until the project’s apparent termination, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (known as DARPA) was developing the Arclight HBG weapon,
designed around the RIM-161 Standard Missile 3 booster stack and designed to
achieve full compatibility with strike-length Mk 41 VLS naval batteries. Arclight
was built to deliver an HGV payload with a total mass of 45–90 kg out to a range
of 3,700 km in less than thirty minutes.78 Although budget reports suggest that
the Arclight program has been terminated, it does provide insight into the types
of capabilities that might be feasible.
Any future hypersonic undersea strike missile would need to be fully compatible with the U.S. Navy’s undersea wide-diameter payload tubes, which measure
2.2 meters in diameter and currently store seven UGM-109E Tomahawk landattack missiles.79 Ideally, a future hypersonic undersea strike missile also would
be fully compatible with strike-length Mk 41 VLS cells. Full compatibility with
both launching systems would enable the same missile design to be supported by
Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), Virginia-class nuclearpowered attack submarines (SSNs), and Ohio-class nuclear-powered guidedmissile submarines.
Undersea towed payload modules (TPMs) are another launch option for future USN undersea strike weapons. TPMs essentially are containers fitted with
vertically launched undersea ordnance that would be submerged and towed by
submarines into theater.80 TPMs are the most attractive option for several reasons. First, TPMs lack the expensive crew life support, hotel loads, fuel storage,
and propulsion systems of surface combatants and submarines, and they can be
acquired in large numbers. Second, TPMs could be pre-positioned in littoral
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/5

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 46

12

2/25/19 10:40 AM

Goldsmith: U.S. Conventional Access Strategy: Denying China a Conventional F

GOLDSMITH

47

waters near Guam years in advance of any conflict. Third, targeting data could
be uploaded by the towing submarine into a TPM computer system prior to
launch. An onboard TPM computer system would enable the TPM to activate
on a time delay, giving the towing submarine time to escape the area before the
TPM launch cycle compromised its location. At the outbreak of hostilities, one or
more submarines could tow the pre-positioned TPMs to within striking distance
of the Chinese mainland.
Antisatellite Strike and Cyberstrike Weapons. ASAT strike weapons would enable the U.S. military to neutralize Chinese military and civilian satellite constellations rapidly.81 Similarly, cyberstrike capabilities would enable the U.S. military
to degrade the effectiveness of PLA C4ISR networks. These targets would be a
high priority for the United States since PLA counterintervention capabilities rely
on space-based assets to enhance OTH targeting of U.S. bases and moving ships
at sea.82 In theater, ASAT capabilities are launched from ground-based missile
launchers. Out of theater, ASAT capabilities enter by way of destroyer-launched
ordnance.
Autonomous Underwater Vehicles. Long-range AUVs with large conventional
warheads would enable forward-deployed U.S. forces to strike at Chinese port
infrastructure, PLA naval bases, and PLA hardened submarine pens accessed
by sea-level undersea tunnels. Notice that only the entrance to a PLA hardened
sea-level tunnel would need to be sealed or rendered impassable to generate a
mission-kill effect and trap any submarines inside the PLA undersea facility.
Boeing’s Echo Voyager unmanned undersea vehicle measures 2.6 by 2.6 by
15.5 meters, is fully autonomous, and has a range of around 12,038 km. It also
has a maximum diving depth of three thousand meters and seagoing endurance
of several months, is fitted with non-GPS navigation technologies, and is capable
of carrying very large payloads of up to eight tons, with a total internal space of
14.75 square meters. The Boeing Echo Voyager uses an inertial navigation system
(INS), Doppler velocity logs (DVLs), depth sensors, and various other technologies to navigate independent of GPS satellite navigation constellations. Given the
exceptional range, seagoing endurance, diving depth, GPS-independent navigation technologies, and large payload, Boeing’s Echo Voyager could be an ideal
baseline from which to build an AUV tailored specifically for neutralizing or
rendering inoperable Chinese ports, PLA naval bases, and PLA hardened submarine pens, particularly by attacking sea-level tunnel entrances. To ensure the survivability of AUVs from PLA conventional strikes, AUVs should be submerged
in littoral waters close to shore, or alternatively stored in hardened underground
facilities ashore.83
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The PLA has invested extensively in capabilities to deny U.S. forces access to
satellite-based C4ISR and GPS navigation systems, particularly given its perception that space-based satellite constellations are a major vulnerability.84 Consequently, a credible U.S. conventional theater-strike capability would need to be
capable of functioning in denied war-fighting environments. In practical terms,
this means that HBG theater-strike missiles, Arclight HBG weapons, ASAT
weapons, and AUVs must be capable of executing their respective roles without
access to last-minute intelligence from C4ISR, space-based communications
systems, and space-based navigation systems. Instead, all these proposed conventional theater-strike capabilities should rely on high-end autonomous navigation systems (ANSs). ANSs might include INSs fitted with advanced-inertialmeasurement-unit components, DVLs, and advanced computing systems.85
Because of the threat that PLA kinetic and nonkinetic strikes pose against
C4ISR capabilities, at the outset of a conflict forward-deployed U.S. forces may
not have access to late-minute intelligence.86 Furthermore, computer networks
containing critical information might be disabled or destroyed. As a contingency,
the United States could deliver hard-copy intelligence packets with targeting data
to forward-deployed forces. This would enable forward-deployed forces to target
at least China’s fixed land and coastal targets, even if C4ISR is unavailable.
Theater-Recovery Capability
A theater-recovery capability would enable the U.S. military to regain use of its
in-theater bases and space-based infrastructure after a PLA conventional first
strike. Central to this capability would be the ability to repair damage to bases by
relying only on resources forward deployed at each base, resources deployed by
assets that would not require runway access, or both. A theater-recovery capability would consist of hardened in-theater facilities, pre-positioned air-base-repair
kits and machinery, airdrop repair teams, airships, and microsatellite launches.
Hardened facilities would shield personnel, supplies, repair kits, and reserve
air- and missile-defense (AMD) systems from a PLA conventional first strike.
Ideally, hardened facilities would be buried deep underground. Airdrop repair
teams would enable the U.S. military to repair damaged runways at bases without requiring USAF C-5 and C-17 airlifters to land. The USAF maintains prime
base engineer emergency force (Prime BEEF) units that execute on-site repairs,
largely using equipment and stores located at each base. Prime BEEF units are
supplemented by USAF rapid engineer deployable heavy operational repair
squadron engineer (RED HORSE) units, which specialize in repairing air bases
under combat conditions. RED HORSE units can be air-dropped into distant
locations, and they aim to be capable of operating without support for limited
durations.87
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If current heavy machinery is too heavy or bulky to be air-dropped and a
PLA conventional first strike were to render most on-base heavy repair equipment unusable, it would be more difficult for air-dropped RED HORSE teams to
repair major damage such as large-diameter craters. One solution might be for
the USAF to develop a suite of custom, lightweight, facility-repair machines that
could be air-dropped, along with RED HORSE units and supporting stores, into
theater from C-5 and C-17 airlifters.
Large-payload airships would bolster repair capabilities without use of runways. An extended-range variant of the Lockheed Martin P-791 hybrid airship
could fulfill such a role; the current version has a range of 2,592 km carrying a
payload of 21,000 kg.88 To reach Guam, an extended-range P-791 would need a
range of around 3,300 km to deploy nonstop from Darwin Royal Australian Air
Force (RAAF) air base, in northern Australia. Alternatively, an existing P-791
airship could island-hop from Wheeler Army Airfield on Oahu to Midway Atoll
(around 2,087 km), from Midway to Wake Atoll (around 1,900 km), and from
Wake Atoll to Andersen Air Force Base on Guam (around 2,400 km).
Microsatellite launches would enable the United States rapidly to supplement
or replace USAF navigation, communications, and intelligence satellites lost to
PLA ASAT strikes.89 The airborne launch assist space access (ALASA) vehicle,
as deployed from USAF fourth-generation aircraft, could fill this role, given its
ability to launch several microsatellites at short notice.90
Rapid-Response Capability
In the aftermath of a PLA conventional first strike, runways on Guam and other
U.S. islands in the western Pacific likely would be inoperable, at least until repaired by Prime BEEF or RED HORSE teams. After initial repairs were complete,
the United States could fly long-range stealth bombers into theater, from Hawaii
and the U.S. mainland, so as to execute long-range conventional strikes against
hardened targets across the Chinese mainland. The pre-positioning of GBU-57
ordnance in HDBTs on Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands would significantly enhance a USAF rapid-response capability, as the logistics burden would
be greatly alleviated.
USAF B-2 Spirit stealth bombers have an unrefueled combat radius of around
5,500 km.91 However, the USAF inventory contains only twenty B-2s, as the
acquisition program was reduced significantly from an original order of 132
aircraft.92 The USAF also is replacing its legacy B-1B and B-52H bomber fleets
with one hundred B-21 Raider long-range stealth bombers.93 However, the
B-21 Raider could have an unrefueled combat radius as short as 4,600 km—
significantly shorter than the B-1B at 6,900 km and the B-52H at 8,100 km.94
Assuming that the B-21 Raider has a combat radius of at least 5,500 km, both
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B-2s and B-21s would be capable of executing deep strikes across the Chinese
mainland without access to in-flight refueling—as deep as Haixi City from Guam
or the Cocos Islands. Both the B-2 and B-21 can deliver the enormous GBU-57
MOP, which measures eighty centimeters in diameter by 6.25 meters in length
and weighs 13,600 kg per bomb. The B-2 is capable of carrying two GBU-57
MOPs, one in each internal weapons bay.95
If a PLA conventional first strike denied use of runways on Guam and the Cocos Islands, USAF B-2s and B-21s could operate from the RAAF Learmonth air
base, in western Australia, outside the range of most PLA conventional strike capabilities.96 Assuming the B-21 Raider has an unrefueled combat radius of 5,500
km, USAF B-2s and B-21s operating from RAAF Learmonth could be refueled
from RAAF in-flight refueling tankers orbiting the Cocos Islands, followed by
strikes out to 5,500 km. The return journey would be the mirror opposite, with
in-flight refueling above the Cocos Islands before returning to RAAF Learmonth.
The advantage of this option is that it would depend only on in-flight refueling
tankers and RAAF air bases outside the range of most PLA conventional strike
capabilities, and thus would provide a robust contingency plan.97
However, a fleet of 120 long-range stealthy bombers (twenty B-2s and one
hundred B-21s) is unlikely to meet the U.S. military’s operational needs during a
China-U.S. conflict, for several reasons. First, the high number of targets across
the Chinese mainland, exacerbated by the significant distance from Guam, will
reduce drastically the fleet-wide sortie rate—the number of targets that a bomber
can strike per twenty-four-hour period.98 Second, only a fraction of the entire
fleet will be available for combat operations, as the rest will be needed for training, maintenance, and reserve functions.99 For instance, a combat-coded force of
160 B-21 Raiders would require an overall fleet of two hundred aircraft.100 Third,
the B-2s and B-21s would play a disproportionate role in the air war portion of
any China-U.S. conflict.101 This is because B-2s and B-21s would be the only
aircraft in the USAF inventory with sufficient stealth to penetrate advanced PLA
air defenses; sufficient unrefueled range to strike at the Chinese mainland from
Guam, without depending on in-flight refueling tankers; and sufficient payload
to carry the GBU-57 MOP for neutralizing PLA HSs. In 2015, the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies found that the USAF might require a total fleet of two
hundred stealthy long-range bombers, particularly given reduced sortie rates,
combat coding, payloads, and the risk of force attrition.102
INVENTORY ESTIMATES
During any armed conflict nothing ever works perfectly or goes entirely according to plan. As Clausewitz once stated, this concept of “friction” means that the
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outcome of military operations is inherently uncertain and that any element of a
plan can fail.103 In the cases of conventional theater-strike, theater-recovery, and
rapid-response operations, the United States would need to consider how many
stores of various types are sufficient to respond to operational uncertainties that
might arise. For instance, conventional theater-strike capabilities could exhaust
in-theater ordnance stores, theater-recovery capabilities could run out of baserepair kits, and a rapid-response capability could run out of in-theater groundpenetrating ordnance.
To insulate against operational uncertainties, U.S. forward bases would need
large pre-positioned inventories of theater-strike missiles sufficient for at least
two strikes per PLA target. This estimate of two strikes per PLA target is based
on the RAND Corporation’s assessment that two weapons per hard target would
be needed to generate a kill probability of greater than 90 percent.104 In addition, the U.S. military would need to retain a strategic reserve of ordnance, in
the event that in-theater stores were exhausted, as well as for use in other global
contingencies.
For the theater-recovery capability, U.S. forward bases likely would need very
large inventories of base-repair kits and ALASA ordnance with microsatellite
payloads pre-positioned and sufficient to execute two full base repairs or ALASA
salvos, plus strategic reserves at mainland facilities for an additional four full base
repairs and four ALASA salvos. These reserves might be necessary if the PLA
executes persistent strikes and ASAT attacks throughout a protracted conflict.105
A rapid-response capability might need very large inventories of prepositioned GBU-57 MOP ordnance and aviation fuel, in shallow-underground
HS facilities at U.S. forward bases. This might require sufficient ordnance for two
strikes per PLA target, plus a strategic reserve for further combat sorties or use
in other global contingencies.
ADVANTAGES OF A U.S. CONVENTIONAL ACCESS STRATEGY
A conventional access strategy would provide six major advantages. The first is
that it would deny the PLA a conventional first-strike capability against U.S. bases
and forward-deployed forces, through passive-defense measures, a conventional
theater-strike capability, a theater-recovery capability, and a rapid-response capability. With passive hardening of critical military infrastructure, a greater portion
of U.S. forces might survive the initial waves of PLA conventional strikes. Surviving in-theater forces could then execute land-based, undersea, ASAT, and AUV
strikes against a variety of PLA targets, across the Chinese mainland and in orbit.
This would enable the U.S. military to begin degrading the PLA’s capabilities at
the outset of a conflict, enabling theater-recovery capabilities to operate more
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effectively. With airfields repaired, B-21 and B-2 stealth bombers could then be
flown into theater to commence strikes against PLA targets across the Chinese
mainland.
The second advantage is that degrading PLA conventional strike capabilities
at the outset of a conflict would increase the permissiveness of the entire theater
for other force-projection assets. Undermining the PLA’s capability to execute
ASBM and ASCM strikes against USN task forces and logistics ships would provide USN assets with greater freedom of action and enhanced survivability. With
intense and persistent conventional strikes, PLA capabilities might be degraded
sufficiently to enable USN aircraft carriers eventually to operate with relative
impunity close to the Chinese coastline, significantly increasing the sorties generated by carrier air wings.
The third advantage is that it would buy time for U.S. force-projection capabilities to be mobilized, marshaled, and deployed to the western Pacific. With
significant air and naval assets deployed globally, the military would require time
to redeploy and logistically support a significant force in theater. For example, a
1993 General Accounting Office report stated that with a total projected force of
twelve USN aircraft carriers, six carriers could deploy with thirty days’ notice and
nine carriers with sixty days’ notice.106 Equivalent times likely would be required
to deploy or redeploy the full range of U.S. air, land, and sea assets necessary to
execute theater-wide, joint-service campaigns in the Pacific.
The fourth advantage is that it would focus the military’s attention on critical capabilities needed to enhance the survivability and operational effectiveness of traditional force-projection assets: tactical aircraft, in-flight refueling
tankers, aircraft carriers, surface combatants, logistics ships, and sealift ships.
For instance, prioritizing long-range strike capabilities not dependent on U.S.
bases or in-flight refueling would in turn drive the military to prioritize conventional theater-strike missiles, undersea-launched hypersonic missiles, ASAT and
cyberstrike weapons, and AUVs, combined with a large fleet of B-21s with range
similar to the B-2 Spirit.
The fifth advantage is that a credible U.S. conventional theater-strike capability would force the PLA to reevaluate its allocation of resources to offensive versus
defensive systems. The PLA might be driven to divert sizable defense funding to
harden its vulnerabilities further across the vast Chinese mainland and improve
costly AMD systems. This would reduce the funding available for the PLA to
pursue offensive war-fighting systems.
The sixth advantage is that a U.S. capacity to execute a conventional theater
strike from the Cocos Islands would complicate significantly the PLA’s operations to defend the Chinese mainland. During a South China Sea or East China
Sea crisis, the PLA could deploy most of its AMD systems along China’s east and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/5

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 52

18

2/25/19 10:40 AM

Goldsmith: U.S. Conventional Access Strategy: Denying China a Conventional F

GOLDSMITH

53

southeast coastlines. However, if the Australian government allowed the U.S.
military to operate conventional B-21s or HBG theater-strike missiles from the
Cocos Islands, the PLA would have to defend a significantly greater area. For
instance, PLA AMD units would have to be more thinly dispersed along China’s
vast coastline as well as along the land borders of its Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces. Consequently, U.S. strike bombers and theater-strike missiles
would have an improved capability to penetrate PLA AMD networks and neutralize the intended targets.
LIMITATIONS OF A U.S. CONVENTIONAL ACCESS STRATEGY
A conventional access strategy would incur seven major limitations.
Homeland Sanctuary
The first limitation is the vexing issue of homeland sanctuary: the concept that
nuclear powers refrain from attacking the homelands of other nuclear powers, to
avoid triggering a nuclear response. The argument is that in a China-U.S. conflict
each side would initially avoid strikes against the other’s homeland, even with
conventional ordnance, to minimize the risk of nuclear escalation.107 It has been
pointed out that this asymmetry could allow China to strike at U.S. territories in
the western Pacific, such as Guam and the Northern Marianas, without retaliatory U.S. strikes on the PLARF and Chinese mainland—at least initially.
Four problems arise out of this argument. First, forward-deployed U.S. forces
at overseas territories such as Guam and the Northern Marianas are likely to be
heavily inundated by barrages of PLA ordnance in the initial phase of any ChinaU.S. conflict. Such PLA strikes are likely to inflict very heavy losses in terms of
personnel and combat assets and other matériel.108 In such a scenario, the United
States might inadvertently honor homeland sanctuary as a direct result of successful PLA strikes degrading U.S. in-theater capabilities. However, high losses
also would trigger significant pressure from Congress, cabinet secretaries, senior
officials, and the general public for the president to authorize robust conventional
strikes against targets across the Chinese mainland.
Second, even if the United States suffered very heavy initial losses in personnel and matériel, it eventually would execute high-intensity conventional strikes
across the Chinese mainland, if U.S. force-projection assets were able to deploy into
theater. For instance, the JOAC, which contains the ASBC and Gaining and Maintaining Access Concept (GMAC), aims to execute high-intensity, war-fighting
operations and strikes against the homelands of A2/AD adversaries.109 Notice
also that the GMAC explicitly states that U.S. Army and Marine Corps special
forces might be inserted covertly into an adversary’s homeland to “provide human contact to complement other intelligence.”110
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Third, the U.S. Department of Defense openly acknowledges that the military
must be ready to execute joint military operations against A2/AD adversaries
“at the outset of a contingency to avoid delays for buildups.”111 The JOAC states
that “joint forces will attempt to penetrate into the depth of an enemy’s antiaccess/area-denial defenses . . . to disrupt the integrity of the enemy defensive
system.”112 The ASBC states that deep strikes against A2/AD adversaries have the
objective of “disrupting, destroying or defeating an adversary’s A2/AD capabilities.” The ASBC also states that “even the US homeland cannot be considered a
sanctuary.”113 The deep-strike objectives of Pentagon operating concepts and the
notion of covert special forces teams operating across the Chinese mainland,
combined with the stated need to be ready at the outset of a conflict and open
acknowledgment that the U.S. homeland could be targeted, strongly suggest that
the U.S. military does not plan on granting the PLA homeland sanctuary during
a China-U.S. conflict.
Fourth, the United States, owing to its geographic distance from the western
Pacific, could be seen by global public opinion as a largely unnecessary target.
This is in stark contrast to the Chinese homeland, which out of necessity would
be seen as a valid target for conventional U.S. strikes, since the vast majority of
PLA conventional-strike capabilities are land-based ballistic missiles and longrange bombers. Consequently, if the PLA executed conventional strikes against
the U.S. mainland, particularly in a conflict in which China was viewed globally
as the aggressor, then global public opinion could strengthen the scale of coalition forces levied against the PLA. This would be true particularly in the case of
U.S. allies and security partners that otherwise might opt out of direct participation in a China-U.S. conflict. As the RAND Corporation has noted, in a short
conflict third parties would make little difference, but in a more protracted conflict between China and the United States the implications could be significant.114
Despite these counterarguments, the Chinese government still might believe
that the PLA could strike at U.S. forces in the western Pacific with minimal risk
of conventional strikes against the Chinese mainland, given an asymmetry in
homeland sanctuary.
Treaty Limitations on Aircraft
The second limitation is that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New
START) severely handicaps the acquisition of B-21 Raider long-range strike
bombers, since the aircraft will be capable of delivering both conventional and
nuclear ordnance.115 New START requires U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals not
to exceed 1,500 nuclear warheads and eight hundred nuclear delivery vehicles,
with seven hundred deployed and one hundred not deployed.116 Under New
START, nuclear delivery vehicles are defined as ICBMs, submarine-launched

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/5

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 54

20

2/25/19 10:40 AM

Goldsmith: U.S. Conventional Access Strategy: Denying China a Conventional F

GOLDSMITH

55

ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers.117 A nuclear bomber is defined by New
START as an aircraft that has a maximum one-way range exceeding eight thousand kilometers and that could carry nuclear weapons.118 The problem is that a
B-21 Raider with an unrefueled combat radius of 5,500 km, as needed to strike
deep into the Chinese mainland from Guam, would give the aircraft a total range
of around eleven thousand kilometers. Given that the B-21 will be capable of
delivering both nuclear and conventional ordnance, it will be counted under
New START. Consequently, the challenge for the USAF will be finding a way to
increase the size of its combat-coded conventional long-range stealth bomber
force without violating New START.
One solution would be to produce a nonnuclear-capable variant of the B-21,
since nonnuclear variants would not count. According to the treaty, a nuclear
bomber is no longer counted once it has been permanently modified to be incapable of delivering nuclear ordnance and is visibly distinguishable from nuclearcapable variants.119 Modifications include ensuring that all mechanisms of the
internal weapon bays are “incapable of employing nuclear armaments.”120 Other
modifications would need to be made to the external design of a conventional
B-21 variant to render it visibly different from the nuclear variant.121 With a
conventional-only B-21 variant, the United States theoretically could produce as
many conventional B-21s as it requires without breaching New START. Another
solution might be to reduce modestly the USAF’s inventory of nuclear-armed
ICBMs, from four hundred under New START to three hundred.122 This would
allow the USAF to order a total of two hundred B-21 Raiders and still comply
with New START. Ultimately, either solution would increase significantly the
number of combat-coded B-21s, greatly enhancing the capacity of the USAF to
execute long-range strikes across the Chinese mainland from Guam. Moreover,
increasing the B-21 Raider production order to two hundred or more units would
drive down acquisition costs by distributing fixed research, development, and
other costs over a larger production run.
Treaty Limitations on Weapons
The third limitation is that the acquisition of conventional theater-strike HBG
weapons could breach New START, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty, or both. Under New START, an ICBM is defined as a nuclearcapable system that travels for most of its flight path in a ballistic trajectory, with
a range exceeding 5,500 km.123 The INF Treaty requires that U.S. and Russian
militaries dismantle all ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km.
The INF Treaty defines a ballistic missile as a weapon that follows a ballistic trajectory for the majority of its flight path.124
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However, HBG weapons do not follow a ballistic trajectory for the majority of
their flight path and thus would not be subject to limitations under New START
or the INF Treaty.125 Consequently, the U.S. military could develop an HBG
weapon with a range of 5,500 km or greater, yet avoid breaching either treaty.
First-Strike Risk
The fourth limitation is that launching one or more HBG weapons could be misconstrued by the PLA, Russia, or both as a U.S. nuclear first strike. This risk has
been discussed since the conceptualization of hypersonic boost-glide systems,
because they depend on long-range rocket boosters similar to those that nucleararmed ballistic missiles use.
However, the nonballistic flight path of hypersonic boost-glide weapons, plus
a brand-new rocket booster design, would make a U.S. hypersonic boost-glide
system appear distinct on Chinese and Russian nuclear early-warning systems.126
If the United States were able to assure China and Russia that its hypersonic
boost-glide systems were used exclusively for conventional payloads, this would
further reduce the likelihood of HBG-weapon use being misinterpreted as a
nuclear first strike.
Potential Nuclear Aggression
The fifth limitation is that striking at the PLA’s conventional ballistic-missile
manufacturing and maintenance facilities, storage facilities, and launchers could
be misconstrued as an attempt by the United States to degrade the PLA’s nuclear
deterrent.127 This risk would arise because U.S. theater commanders would be
unable to distinguish readily between nuclear and conventional versions of the
PLA’s ballistic-missile arsenal, particularly if U.S. C4ISR systems were degraded
by PLA ASAT and cyber strikes.
This problem could be solved through a U.S.-China bilateral agreement for the
PLA to separate clearly its nuclear ballistic missiles from its conventional arsenal
and a mutual commitment to exclude all nuclear deterrents from targeting. The
net result would be a reduced risk of U.S. conventional strikes inadvertently targeting PLA nuclear capabilities.
Hardened Structures
The sixth limitation is that a U.S. conventional access strategy might not overcome the PLA’s extensive investments in hardened structures. This is a very
real possibility. To paraphrase Moltke, no plan, however good, survives contact
with the enemy.128 However, the measures proposed under a U.S. conventional
access strategy would provide a reasonable ability to neutralize PLA hardened
facilities, such as underground tunnels and sea-level submarine pens. This conventional access strategy prioritizes advanced penetrator ordnance delivered by
HBG theater-strike missiles and B-2s and B-21s, as well as AUVs armed with
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large conventional warheads for sea-level tunnels and submarine pens. While
the penetration capabilities of all ordnance might not be able to overcome PLA
HDBTs, such as tunnels buried deep within mountains, what this ordnance could
do is target the most vulnerable points of these structures. For instance, these
weapons could target external communications links and surface-level entrances.
By targeting surface-level entrances of PLA hardened facilities, U.S. penetrator
ordnance could be sufficient to seal the structures from the outside world, or at
the very least impede the movement of traffic in and out of the facilities. The advantage of targeting surface-level entrances is that every underground hardened
structure must be accessible from the surface, making them a vulnerability of all
PLA HSs and HDBTs that can be exploited.
Survivable and Capable Force-Projection Capability
A seventh limitation is that the United States might consider fielding a highly
survivable and capable force-projection capability designed to achieve the same
objective as the proposed conventional access strategy, just with less risk of escalation. While it is true that the United States could field a highly capable and
survivable force-projection capability, funding levels will determine whether it
will do so.
To field a force structure capable of defeating A2/AD adversaries, the U.S.
military would need to invest in many of the nine following critical capabilities:
arsenal ships; additional future guided-missile frigates (FFG-Xs); additional
Virginia-class SSNs; a large number of AUVs; a new, sixth-generation, long-range,
carrier-based strike aircraft; a new, sixth-generation, long-range, land-based
air-superiority fighter; additional B-21 Raiders; a new, stealthy C3 intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR) aircraft; and a new, stealthy, in-flight
refueling tanker (see table 2). The numerous new research, development, and
acquisition programs needed would cost hundreds of billions of dollars, even
without accounting for significant additional orders of DDGs, FFG-Xs, SSNs,
and B-21s.
In short, the United States can field a highly survivable and capable counterA2/AD force—it is just a question of the funding and political willingness to do
so. Conversely, a U.S. conventional access strategy aims to achieve similar powerprojection objectives with less of a burden to the U.S. taxpayer, or fewer seismic
departures from the planned military force structure, or both.
The PLA’s counterintervention capabilities could be used to execute a conventional first strike against U.S. bases and forward-deployed forces west of Hawaii.
The Chinese leadership could be convinced that a decisive conventional first
strike, in conjunction with other PLA capabilities, would provide the PLA with
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TABLE 2
U.S. COUNTER-A2/AD FORCE-PROJECTION CAPABILITIES
Capability

Description

Arsenal ships

The U.S. Navy could consider a new class of large-displacement surface
ship, armed with 288–512 strike-length Mk 41 vertical launching system
cells and a larger, more capable ballistic missile–defense radar than the
AN/SPY-6.

Additional FFG-Xs

The U.S. Navy could consider expanding its order of FFG-Xs to serve
as capable surface combatant escorts for convoys of fleet oilers and drycargo and resupply ships, as would be needed to sustain high-intensity
combat operations in the western Pacific.

Additional nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs)

The U.S. Navy could consider accelerating the acquisition of Virginia
Payload Module–equipped SSNs, particularly given the projected
undersea strike shortfall when the fourth Ohio-class nuclear-powered
guided-missile submarine is retired in 2028.a

Autonomous underwater vehicles
(AUVs)

The U.S. Navy could consider acquiring AUVs armed with lightweight
torpedoes designed to deny maritime zones to PLA surface and subsurface forces.

Sixth-generation carrier-based aircraft

The U.S. Navy could consider truncating its order of F-35Cs in favor of
developing a sixth-generation carrier-based, long-range strike and airsuperiority aircraft.

Sixth-generation land-based aircraft

The U.S. Air Force could consider truncating its order of F-35As in favor
of developing a sixth-generation land-based, long-range air-superiority
aircraft with sufficient unrefueled range to escort B-21s during deeppenetration strikes.

Additional B-21s

The U.S. Air Force could consider retaining its planned fleet of one hundred nuclear-capable B-21s, plus a significant order of conventional-only
B-21s, perhaps on the order of three to four hundred aircraft.

Stealthy C3ISR aircraft

The U.S. Air Force could consider developing a stealthy, very highaltitude, long-range C3ISR aircraft, capable of replacing satellite communications networks during a conflict.

Stealthy in-flight refueling tanker

The U.S. Air Force could consider developing a stealthy, long-range
in-flight refueling tanker. This aircraft should be fitted with a tail ramp
to enable variants to support the covert insertion and sustainment of
special operations forces deep inside hostile territory.

Note:
a. Gunzinger and Dougherty, Outside-In, p. 85.

temporary regional superiority, giving China a rare window of opportunity to
settle regional disputes through coercion and on terms favorable to China. Any
such perception would undermine seriously the U.S. military’s ability to deter
Chinese aggression in the western Pacific.
The solution is not for the U.S. military to build a larger force structure but
rather for it to rearrange its thinking around a conventional access strategy. This
would require the U.S. military to acquire four critical capabilities: a theaterwide passive-defense capability, a conventional theater-strike capability, a
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theater-recovery capability, and a rapid-response capability. Strategically, a conventional access strategy would accomplish several things: it would deny the PLA
a conventional first-strike capability, increase the permissiveness of the western
Pacific for follow-on U.S. forces, buy valuable time needed to mobilize and deploy
U.S. power-projection assets, focus the military’s attention on critical capabilities,
and impose resource constraints on the PLA. However, a conventional access
strategy would require the United States to think seriously about developing
and assigning a new rocket booster exclusively for use by hypersonic boost-glide
systems, as well as to assure Russia and China that U.S. HBG weapons would
carry only conventional payloads. Furthermore, the United States and China
would have to give serious consideration to entering into a bilateral agreement
for the PLA to separate clearly its nuclear ballistic missiles and for both parties to
exclude nuclear deterrents from targeting.
Even with its limitations, a U.S. conventional access strategy would return the
China-U.S. strategic deterrence calculus to a more stable equilibrium. One hopes
that this would deter Chinese leaders from seeing a conventional first strike as a
credible option. Pursuing a U.S. conventional access strategy would be a political
decision for the president and Congress. Such a decision would have to take into
account numerous dimensions, including military, political, fiscal, diplomatic,
and technological maturity considerations. Such discussions fall beyond the
scope of this article but provide ideal areas for future research.
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